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Jan Sieber and Marc Berdet
1 Only after the end of the long 19th century has it become possible to recognise that with
the  emergence  of  modernity  the  mythical  did  not  vanish  but  rather  persisted  or
returned in another form. Authors from various fields and theoretical traditions have
noted the persistence of the mythical in modern society. As the mythical persists, the
questions remain why, how, and what role it plays. How does the persistence of the
mythical  relate  to  contemporary  society  and  its  various  spheres?  What  is  its
contemporary form - what mythical figures determine contemporary life and thought?
How does the mythical relate to acting, perception and thought?
2 An anthropological materialist perspective on the mythical may allow us to perceive it
as an anthropological condition, which is nonetheless historical and as such malleable.
To conceive such a perspective we start by looking at how Theodor W. Adorno in the
course  of  an  epistolary  quarrel  criticizes  his  friend  Walter  Benjamin  for  his
“anthropological  materialism”.  By  this  concept  he  implied  a  naïve,  romantic
materialism that, like in the case of Ludwig Feuerbach, does not pay enough attention
to  history,  class  conflict  and  the  dialectic  between  economy  and  culture  (which,
according to Adorno, needs much more mediation) and could succumb to the mythical.
In  other  words,  the  anthropological  materialist  is  in  danger  of  arguing  for  a
materialism  that  is  not  historical  enough  and  which,  by  treating  anthropological
phenomena as “natural” or “biological” (Adorno focuses on the human “gesture” which
he understands as a pure positivity in Benjamin’s work) instead of understanding them
as  being  determined  by  social  and  economic  institutions,  falls  into  the  trap  of
mythologising  them.  Myth  could  be  characterised  here1 as  the  mist  of  time,  the
originary dark night, the ambiguous fog from which “man” once escaped and should
not return to, but also as a misleading story “man” tells him or herself about his/her
own origin legitimising the existing social order. Nazism would be, in this sense, the
most terrifying political incarnation of the mythical as it sustains irrational behavior
and expels rational reflection. 
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3 The question here is how to abolish the mythical completely, including the mythologies
of everyday life, the mythologies of politics and even the mythologies of reason itself.
This  destruction of  all  mythologies aims at  establishing a totally rationalised world
(including a rationalisation of economy, that is to say a fair redistribution of wealth).
To put it with Louis Althusser’s first critique of ideology, we have to stop to tell stories
to oneself and to lie to oneself (“arrêter de se raconter des histoires”).
4 But Adorno’s argument could also be inverted into a materialist anthropological one.
While paying tribute to the Frankfurter Jürgen Habermas, Michel Foucault recognises
the  importance  of  extending the  programme of  the  Enlightenment  like  the  second
generation of the Frankfurt School does, but insists on the necessity of avoiding any
overestimation of the “rational discourse” that could hide the still existing human will-
to-power still present in the ideal of the public sphere: the danger would be that of
creating  a  reassuring  myth  and  avoiding  to  fight  the  injustices  which  reproduce
themselves  behind such a  screen.  The programme of  the Frankfurt  School  remains
valid, but has to be true to the “masters of suspicion” (Nietzsche, Marx, Freud) in order
to  avoid  new  ways  of  mythologising.  In  a  similar  fashion,  another  materialist
anthropologist, Pierre Clastres, is a good example of how the seemingly rational
argument of a political progress from “primitive” to industrial, rationalised societies, is
only another way of creating a myth, the one of a poor primitiveness deprived of a
state,  in  order  to  legitimise  an  allegedly  proper  political  order  with  a  state  and  a
flourishing economy. 
5 Destroying  such  myths  would,  for  example,  mean  showing  how  some  societies  are
trying to resist the formation of a state through certain rituals and complex political
structures that are made to prevent the unlimited power of only one man. In this way
anthropology can help to destroy the myth of triumphant occidental reason, which
sees itself as progressing from a legendary beginning (the state of nature, as Hobbes
described it) to a legendary end (the resolution of all conflicts by a benevolent State).
This  anthropology  would  be  materialist  without  being  economistic  and  without
submitting to mechanical  laws,  cycles of  forces of  production or trains of progress.
Such a materialist anthropology is political from the very start.
6 For  this  reason,  Walter  Benjamin  inverted  Adorno’s  critique  of  “anthropological
materialism” and used the term in a polemical way: an anthropological dimension has
to be included into historical materialism in order to prevent it being “metaphysical”,
or mechanical, i. e. focussed on some abstracts “laws of history” (like those that render
history  a  progression from a primitive  community  lacking a  state  to  an intelligent
society with a state, or from the law of the survival of the fittest to consensus generated
through reasonable  discussion).  The problem of  a  collective  body that  could  act  in
history is, for Benjamin, too important to being left to the fascists and Nazis, and that is
probably the reason why Benjamin flirts with what he suspects to be a fascist aesthetics
(namely that of Ludwig Klages, Carl Gustav Jung, but also of the College de Sociology,
and particularly Roger Caillois) attempting to problematise anthropological positivities
such as the “collective unconscious”, the “archaic unconscious” or the “archaic image”.
7 But while one has to dive deep into the mythical, one also has to break out of it. It is as
if  the  condition  of  breaking  out  is  to  dive  in  first.  As  for  every  materialist
anthropologist, the problem of the anthropological materialist is to escape the mythical
– but only after having known deeply that from which he is escaping, in order to avoid
a dangerous return of the repressed.
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8 Rosa Eidelpes insists on the richness of Roger Caillois’s “mythical” epistemology. One
has  to  point  out,  as  Adorno  did,  the  danger  of  reducing  cultural  constructions  (as
children’s  tales  or  Sade’s  literature)  to  biological  phenomena  as  “proto-fascist”
(because it could legitimate a “biological” politics more appropriate to human nature).
The devouring of the male by the female mantis during copulation could well be the
universal  source  of  castration  anxiety,  nevertheless  it  remains  that  cultural
constructions  are  elaborating  this  pre-cultural  anxiety  into  a  linguistic  world  that
escapes from the natural world. Eidelpes recapitulates the more recent and convincing
critiques against Caillois’  anthropology. Not “scientific” in the strict sense, Caillois’s
attempt to combine anthropology with biology transforms itself into a mythology. But,
at  the  same  time,  Eidelpes  illuminates  Caillois’s  ability  to  demonstrate,  against  all
academic trends, how we are still determined by nature. And he does that by means of
a “diagonal science” that, surprisingly capable to enlighten our collective imagination
(from the daily life to universal tales) with entomology, ends up with a new, productive
relation between science and fiction.
9 Andrew Mac Gettigan’s new translation of a famous testimony from Pierre Klossowski
(a member of the Collège de Sociologie with Roger Caillois) on Walter Benjamin reveals
the core of “anthropological materialism” surrounded by myth. In this text published
in Le Monde,  Klossowski draws the picture of the German philosopher when he was
assisting the conferences of the Collège: while Benjamin wanted to include collective
passions into a socialist organisation of work in a new form of phalanstery, he always
warned members of  the Collège to stay away from a pure aesthetic  of  the myth,  a
positive conception of these passions that could carry them along the slippery slope of
fascism and Nazism. Benjamin here reproduces Adorno’s argument for his own sake.
10 As Takaoki Matsui and Elise Derroite argue, mythic fate is Benjamin’s theme from the
beginning of his work. The myth in question here is the power of nature and of its gods
that invades human representations and actions like a “fog”: man always has to pay
retrospectively for an offense he could have made against the gods – a pattern that the
patricians were able to reproduce in order to dominate the plebeians in the same way
the first humans were oppressed by unpredictable omnipotent gods. Matsui’s article
explores  the  role  of  colour  in  Benjamin’s  aesthetics  and  in  particular  “the  mythic
appearance of colour” in relation to the antagonistic tension between guilt, debt and
shame. The children’s blush, for example, is a sign of such prehistoric relation to guilt,
debt  and  shame.  By  means  of  an  original  examination  of  the  interlaid  aspects  of
Benjamin’s  critical  reading  of  Simmel,  Goethe,  and  Baudelaire  on  colour,  Matsui
underlines  Benjamin's  contribution  to  the  critique  of  capitalism  as  a  system  that
produces debt (verschuldend).  For Derroite,  the task of the poet is to escape from a
conformist mythology, and to articulate his own experience into a “plastic” experience
of history. Through Derroite’s translation of Benjamin’s philosophy of art into a general
theory of history that remains in all his work, plasticity has to be understood both as
the plasticity of the historical world, as the plasticity of the poet’s subjectivity, as the
plasticity of Benjamin’s criticism and, last but not least, as the plasticity of the subject
making history.  The “poeticised” (Gedichtete)  is  the concept of  such a revolutionary
creativity: it names the space where the poet becomes aware of this plasticity of the
world and of his creative power upon it.
11 Aujke Van Rooden tries to actualise such a concept of myth, which is also present in
Benjamin’s anarchist text Critique of Violence, on recent political phenomena, notably in
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Holland. She defends the idea that contemporary political orders erect themselves on a
mythical circle, which intertwines foundation and conservation. This also has to do with
a mythical violence (not only in the sense of brutality but also in the sense of the German
verb walten), endlessly performed in the perpetuation of the political order. There is a
complete mythical oblivion of this violence in contemporary political orders, which is the
oblivion of the contingent decision that erected political order itself, i. e. an oblivion of
its  historicity.  Consequently,  this  mythical  circle  should  be  broken,  but  Benjamin
suggests it can only be broken by a Durchbrechung,  a “divine violence”. Van Rooden
suggests something less radical, but maybe more practicable: as it doesn’t seem totally
possible to break the mythical circle in our societies, maybe it is possible to interrupt it,
by developing a non-political discourse within the political order.
12 The not thematically-based part of the current issue presents texts on various topics:
an interview, a philosophical essay, ten thesis on actual political philosophy, a reply on
formerly published articles and a book review.
13 In  an  interview with  Susan Buck-Morss  Joanna Kusiak discusses  the  contradiction
between Buck-Morss's support of the Occupy Wall Street movement and her claim of
the  non-existence  of  a  political  ontology.  Exploring the  philosophical  roots  of  her
“prejudice against ontology” Buck-Morss explains the repercussions of “start[ing] from
a claim of ontological position, and the limitations it imposes by means of an apriorism
that bars one from the possibility of recognising his or own error”. Buck-Morss and
Kusiak also debate the role of irrationality as regards the “psychological strategies of
capitalism”, the reception of the OWS by the Left and the role of event or surprise in
the historical process.
14 In the section Materialist Experiments Jan Rolletschek argues for the concept of a free
association and against certain tendencies in contemporary left political philosophy to
repudiate it in favour of the State. In his ten theses he defends why and argues how the
free  association  in  its  ideal  identity  of  free  equality  and  equal  freedom  has  to  be
thought against all doubts and practised as a real movement of liberation against the
movement of capital.
15 Stéphane Nadaud and Murasawa Mahoro are using Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s
anthropology  –  deterritorialisation,  body  without  organs  –  in  order  to  pioneer  a
“philosophy  of  the  intestine”  that  radicalises  and  exceeds  the  Promethean  myth.
Abandoning the field of mythological metaphors, animals, vegetables and microbes are
conceived as hungry bowels using their extremities in order to extend their digestive
territories  around  their  bodies.  But  humans  transgressed  their  own  boundaries  by
mastering fire. This event signalled not only the rise of the human mind, but also of the
difference between brain and intestine, metaphysics and physics, the high and the low
order  of  the  universe.  The  invention  of  the  city  is  itself  redefined  as  a  spatial
reorganisation of bowel production.
16 In  the  Varia-section  Sami  Khatib responds  to  Michael  Löwy's  article  on  Walter
Benjamin and surrealism, published in the previous issue of A+M. In his response he
discusses the theme of “profane illumination” underlining its anthropological capacity
in  unearthing  the  everyday  structures  of  life  under  capitalism  and  elucidates  the
relation  of  ideology  and  politics  according  to  Benjamin’s  anti-representationist
perspective.  Exploring  how  the  surrealist  image-space  unworks  the  boundaries
between the individual and the political collective, Khatib finally examines the concept
Introduction
Anthropology & Materialism, 2 | 2014
4
of “innervation” and its relation to Benjamin’s “second technology” of human-nature
interplay.
NOTES
1. Not in the Levi-Straussian sense of myth, nor in the anthropological sense of myth as related
to ritual, but from a critical theory perspective.
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